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ABSTRACT
This paperexamines the relationship between unfunded vested pension
liabilities and the market value of a firm's skarés. This relationship
has important Implications for the mechanism by which private pensions
influence aggregate savings. Attention is paid to modeling the institutional
determinants of thIsrelationimplied by ERISA legislation. These consi-
dErations require a nonlinear regression model with very special properties
which are developed and discussed. Estimation results suggest that ERISA
has had an important effect on the relation between unfunded benefits and




Princeton, New Jersey 08544
(609) 452—4794This paper examines the effect of unfunded vested pension liabili-
ties1 on the market value of a firm's shares..- The nature of-thisrelationship
has important implications for several aspects of the policy debate on the
private pension system and its reform. As Feldstein (1978) has stressed,
the extent to which unfunded pension liabilities affect stock market values
(MV) is a critical linkage in the mechanism by which private pensions influence
aggregate saving. If, for instance, pension liabilities lower the stock value
on a dollar for dollar basis, then the disincentive to save given to potential
pensioners by an additional dollar of unfunded benefits is exactly offset
by the incentive to save given to stock holders by the loss of a dollar in
stock value. Aggregate saving is not altered. At the other extreme, unfunded
liabilities may have no impact on stock values. In this case there is no
incentive for additional saving to offset any decrease in saving by pensioners.
Another important concern involves the, large potential liabilities
undertaken by a U.S. government agency under the ERISA pension reforms legi-
slation. Beyond certain limits, the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation
(PBGC) relieves private employers of their responsibility for unfunded vested
pension benefits (UVB). An examination of the market valuation effects of
these LJVB can yield evidence on the opinion of stock market participants
about the potential financial drain on the badly undercapitalized PBGC.
Finally, there has been considerable concern over the accuracy of
reporting by firms of their pension liabilities. The relation between MV
and IJVB can be used to infer the view of market participants about the reli-
ability of financial reporting. This evidence hasimplicationsfor the reform
of pension reporting.
-—2-
In Section 1 of the paper I discuss the institutional and theore-
tical determinants of the relation between unfunded pension liabilities and
-thestock-market.value of a firm's shares. Section. 2 develops aneconometric
method appropriate to the estimation of this relationship. Section 3 presents
and discusses the empirical results.—3—
1. The Effect of Unfunded Vested Pension Benefits on the Market Value
ofFirm
Prior to 1974, firms were not legally liable for unfunded vested
pension benefits. A firm could terminate a plan and employees with vested
pension benefits would receive payment only insofar as the pension fund was
adequate. Termination, however, would imply the need to
compensate employees in another form over the long-run if the firmwereto
stay attractive in the labor market. Since compensation through pensions has
tax advantages (Tepper, 1974) and helps control labor turnover costs (Schiller
and Weiss, 1979) most firms continued their plans. In situations
where there was no need to undertake alternative compensation, termination
of a plan could be an attractive option. The Studebaker..Corporation,
for instance, terminated its under-funded plan at the same time it ended auto-
mobile production. Thus the funding decision embodies elements of risk
sharing and implicit contracting between the owners of a firm and its employees
(Arnott and Gersovitz, forthcoming).
In 1974, ERISA established a limited legal responsibility on the
part of firms for their unfunded pension benefits. An employer became liable
for the minimum of its total unfunded vested pension benefits (UVB) or 30
percent of its net worth defined as the stock market value of its shares (MV).
A government sponsored corporation, the PBGC, became liable for any excess
of LJVB over .3MV up to certain limits beyond which employees were left unpro-
tected. The PBGC was also given the right to terminate any plan which it
felt might involve the PBGC in additional liabilities. Further, the PBGC can-4-
S
determinethe value of the firm for purposes of calculating the employer's
liability at any point within a 120 day period around the termination date
2
(the window).
Against this background it is possible to develop an equation for
the market value of a firm with unfunded pension liabilities. If .3MV> UVB,
it is almost certain that the firm will eventually pay the full value of UVB
into the pension fund. If the market value of the firm begins to deteriorate
so that .3MV approaches IJVB, the PBGC will either terminate the plan or
negotiate with the firm to fund enough of the UVB to maintain .3MV >UVB.
Using the 120 day window, the PBGC should have no difficulty making the firm
satisfy this condition. It would be impossible to realize the full value of
UVB only if the firm's value plunged past the .3W! =UVBthreshold, to a
situation where UVB >MV,before the PBGC could act. Except for this highly
unlikely situation, a firm with .3MV >UVBshould have the valuation equation:
(1) MV =PVE-UVB .3MV >IJVB
where PVE is the present value of earnings after all other charges (interest,
preferred dividends etc.) other than UVB.
- Forfirms with UVB >.3W!, however,the situation is more compli-
cated. These firms have the option of terminating their ownplansfor a
payment of .3W!. The firm need not be bankrupt in any sense to exercise this
option. Further, the PBGC may wish to terminate these plans to avoid further
losses. If the plan were definitely known to be on the verge of termination,
the value of the firm's shares would be given by—5-
(2) MV =PVE-UVB+(UVB-. 3MV) .3MV<UVB
where UVB -. 3MVappears as an implicit asset.
At present, however, there are many plans satisfying .3MV <UVB
which do not seem to be in imminent danger of termination. For these firms
there is always the chance that PVE will stochastically move so that
.3MV >UVBin the future. To take this possibility into account requires
an option pricing approach in specifying the market value equation (Sharpe,
1976) which is so complicated as to be intractable (Smith, 1976). As a
practical specification of the effect of UVB on MV, I therefore adopt the
approximation of equations_(l) and (2):
PVE -UVB if .3MV>UVB
(3) MV=
PVE -UVB+(UVB-. 3MV) if .3MV<UVB









and I test the joint restriction that =-1and 2 =1—6—
2. Econometric Method
Estimating the effect of pension liabilities on market value, given
the institutional structure represented by ERISA, is a complicated problem.
The use of conventional ordinary least squares is
inappropriate because the dependent variable appears on both sides of the
estimating equation. Consider the stochastic behavior described by
(4a) y.Ax.+az.+Bw.+v. ifw.>O
1 1 1 1 1 1
(4b) y. =Ax.+az.+v. if w. <0
1 1 1 1 1—
(4c) w. =z.-tSy.
where A is 1 x k vector of unknown coefficients, x. is a k x 1 vector of
1
exogenous variables, z. is an additional exogenous variable, a and B are
unknown coefficients and 45 is a known parameter. The error term, v., is
assumed to be independently normally distributed with constant variance a2.
Since 45 is known, the sign of the expression z -45y.can be ascer-
tained. Any set of N observations can therefore be partitioned with the
first n known to have been generated by equation (4a) while the remaining
N -nare known to have been generated by equation (4b). If all observations
were generated by equation (4b) so that n =0,estimation is quite straight-
forward since the assumptions necessary for ordinary least squares are satis-
fied. Unfortunately the estimation of equation (4b) alone provides no-7--
estimate of the parameter 8.
Equation (4a) by itself, however, poses one immediate difficulty.
The variable w is endogenous since it involvesy, and w1 appears on the
righthand side of the equation. Consequently, (4a) could not be estimated
by ordinary least squares. To correct this problem, substitute in (4a) from
(4c)for w.,,collect terms and rewrite the equation as
Ax.+(cz+8)z. v.
—1 1+ 1 ifw>0 1+ 68 1+68 i
A second problem immediately arises if all observations satisfied w. >0.
While equation (4a') could be estimated by ordinary least squares, thepara-
meters of the model A, a and 8 would not be identified. Instead, only the
composite parameters A/(l+68) and (a+8)/(l+68) would-be identified.
Ifhowever,there are observations for which w. >0and for which
1
w
<0,i.e. N>n>0, estimation of the model is possible and all parameters
can be identified. It is the cross-equation constraints [the fact that the
A and a are the same in equations (4a) and (4b)] which identify the coeffi-
cients. An ordinary least squares procedure is no longer appropriate and
a maximum likelihood formulation must be used. The estimation problem is
similar to that encountered in Tobit (Tobin, 1956) and switching regressions
(Goldfeld and Quandt, 1973) although it has its own unique structure.
The likelihood of for 0 <ic n is given by
1 +68 [i___________ (5a) L. =ria
exP[_
.1+68
The likelihood of y. for N >i>nis given by-8—
(Sb) L. = exp-—
1 2
Thus,the likelihood for the entire sample is
n N
(6) L =(iiL.)(11 L!).
i=l1 i=n+l
1
Maximizationof equation (6) with respect to the parameters of the model
yields the estimates of these parameters. [This maximization was undertaken
at Princeton University in double precision FORTRAN. The method of maximi-
zation was the GRADX option of the GQOPT program based on the method of
quadratic hill-climbing(Goldfeld, Quandtand Trotter,l966)J
A final aspect of this econometric model which deserves special
attention is the problem of consistency. Given a set of observations on the
y and z1, w canbeformed and used to classify the observations. The estima-
tion can then proceed as described. However, since thew is unknown until
the y is generated, and they cannot be known until the w is known, the
model of (4a) -(4c)is not a fully satisfactory formulation. A consistent







(7e) y =y1 w1
>0or w2 >0
(7f) w1<Oorw2<0
where the subscript i has been suppressed and the variable y corresponds
to the y. of (4).
Consistency requirements for this model are that
(8a) w1 >0 iffw2 >0
or
(8b) w1 <0 iff w2 <0.
If these conditions were not met, then a situation could arise where the
model of (7) implied (7e) and (7f) at the same time, an inconsistency un-
less B =0.To express the consistency conditions in terms of the under-
lying parameters of the model, substitute for w1 in (7a), collect terms,
solve for y1 and substitute y1 into w1 to yield
9 —z-Ax-&iz-5y (a) w1— 1+68






From(9c) it is clear that a necessary and sufficient condition
for w1 and w2 to have the same sign is that
(10)
henceforth referred to as the consistency condition for the model (7). In
particular if6 and 8 are both positive, the model is consistent. In this
case, it does not matter whether y1 or y2 is used in the calculation of w.
of model (4), and so model (4) provides a complete characterization of the
estimation problem.
To summarize,the estimation procedure is
(a) form the w using (4c)
(b) classify the observations into two groups with
the first n observations having w1 >0andthe
last N -nobservations having w <0
Cc)form the likelihood function (6) using (5a) and (Sb)
Cd) maximize the likelihood to yield estimates of the
model parameters
Ce) check the consistency requirement 1 +sSB > 0.—11—
3.Econometric Estimates of the Effect of UVBonMV
Followingthe discussion of Section 1, the basic equations deter-
mining the valuation of a firm's shares are:
(Ha) MV 1 e IJVB
r=•r0- X.+1r1 ifw<O
and











(lic) w =UVB -. 3MV
and
(lid) p =p0+p18
MV is the year-end value of outstanding common shares obtained from the
Compustat tapes.
Total earnings, e, are given by the 3-5 year forecast of the
Value Line Investment Survey closest to December multiplied by the total
number of common shares from the Compustat tapes. This earnings measure—13--
TABLE1
1976Stock Valuation Equation
Coefficient Variant 1 Variant 2 Variable
10 —.272 —.298 constant
(6.32) (7.03)








Value of 6.22 —3.30
the Log
Likelihood
Note:Upper rowgivescoefficient, lower row gives coefficient divided
by its asymptotic standard deviation.
Sample consists of 217 Fortune 500 companies chosen on the basis
of data availability. Seventeen companies have UVB>.3MV.-12-
does not include charges for the amortization of unfunded vested benefits.
Results based on the Value Line forecast3 rather than an extrapolation of
current and past earnings are presented because Malkiel and Cragg (1970)
provide evidence that the market opinion approach is superior in valuation
equations. I also used current earnings with similar results to those
reported in Table 1 for the coefficient estimates but with much lower values
of the likelihood function.
The discount rate, p, incorporates 8, the Value Line calculation
of the Sharpe Beta for the firm. This term provides the most common repre-
sentation of a risk adjusted discount rate (Fama, 1977). UVB measures
unfunded vested benefits as given by the Compustat tapes. The variables
MV, e and UVB are divided by the book-value of total assets A (from the
Compustat tapes) to correct for heteroscedasticity.4
Turning to the estimated values of y, it is clear that unfunded
pension liabilities lower the value of a firm's shares. Further, unfunded
liabilities above the PBGC threshold of 30 percent are added back as an
asset since is positive. Recall from Section 2 that a positive value of
was sufficient for the stochastic system generating the data to be logi-
cally consistent. It is also roughly true that 1] += 0.Consequently,
liabilities above .3MV added back in such a way that the net effect of these
additional liabilities is zero.
All these aspects of the estimated coefficients are consistent with
the model of pension liabilities and market valuation elaborated in Section 1,
however, the absolute magnitudes of the estimated coefficients appear too high.
Thus, while one expects that liabilities would diminishthemarket value of
an earnings stream on the dãllar for dollar basis, i.e. =-1,the estimated—:14—
coefficients indicate that every dollar of liabilities diminishes market
value by more than two dollars. The hypothesis that +2
=0and l =-l
can be rejected at less than the one percent level of significance using a
likelihood ratio test (log of the constrained likelihood =2.19).It appears
that the simple model of Section 1 is rejected and that additional consider-
ations must be investigated to understand the role of pension liabilities in
firm valuation.5
First, it is important to relate these results to the findings of
an earlier study of this topic by Oldfield (1977). Oldfield looked at the
effect of pension liabilities on the stock value of firms, but failed to
consider the institutional framework of the PBGC of Section 1 assuming2 =0.
In other respects, Oldfield's specification is basically similar to the one
used here. Within the framework of Variant l, 2 =0is easily imposed
yielding the Variant 2 estimates of Table 1. The effects are quite dramatic;
the estimate of 1 falisin absolute magnitude to somewhat less than one.
This estimate is insignificantly different from one and significantly dif—
ferent from zero. This result suggests a simple explanation for the effect
of pension liabilities as a dollar for dollar subtraction from the valuation
of earnings, as argued by Oldfield using estimates similar to those of Variant
2.
But the Variant 1 equation makes it obvious that this simple formu-
lation is entirely unsatisfactory. It is clear that Variant 2 is indeed a
special case of Variant 1 obtained by restricting 2 to zero; Variant 2 is
nested within Variant 1 and the t-statistic on in Variant 1 directly
tests the appropriateness of a Variant 2 specification. Given the
magnitude of these t-statistics a Variant 2 formulation must be rejected—15—
since 2 is in all cases highly significantly different from zero.
The superficial consistency of a Variant 2 model with the dollar
for dollar penalization of the present value of earnings is nerely a statis-
tical artifact. Consider a model where <0and l +2
=0.For simpli-
city, represent the effects of r0, p and e by the variable PVE, the present
value of earnings. Thus the equations of the model are
(12a) MV =PVE+
11UVB if .3MV >UVB
(i +y2)UVB
(12b) MV = + 1 if .3MV <UVB
l+.312
or
(12b') MV = if.3MV <IJVB
since l +2
=0.
Consider Figure 1, in which line segment ABC gives the relation between
LNB and MV if PVE is constant and assume that all firms.in a hypothetical
cross-section have the saine.PVE but different values.of UVB. Since there is
an error term in the relation between UVB and MV, the hypothetical cross
section might consist of a set of points as pictured. If2 is assumed to
equal zero, then a regression line of the form EF will be estimated rather
than one of the form ABC. The estimated iialue ofwill be biased toward








'MV =PVE + UVB—17—
which UVB >.3MVand the magnitude of UVB -.3MV.It would appear that a
specification error of this form is .responsible for the otherwise seemingly
plausibIe resUlts of Oldfield.
As mentioned above, the estimated value of is inconsistent
with the valuation discussion of Section 1 which incorporates a literal
reading of the ERISA provisions on unfunded benefits. Several plausible
explanations of these results can be considered.
The simplest explanation of the large absolute values of and
is that unfunded vested benefits have been systematically understated.6
Let U] <1be the percentage by which pension liabilities are understated.
For convenience, assume that is constant across companies. Further,
assume that the PBGC bases its decisions on the true value of unfunded
benefitsrather than on the reported value. The model of (11) is then
modified to
UVB
(i.3a) S =P\TE+—INB if .3MV >—
and
(l3b) S = I'VE if 3
Mistakenly estimating a model which assumes =1when is in fact less
than one does not produce a coefficient or the form since the classifi-
cation of the observations is incorrect. However, there will still be a ten-
dency to overestimate the absolute magnitudes of and—18—
Onealternativehypothesis is that market participants view large
unfundedliabilitiesas indicative of financial mismanagement or other
incompetent behavior by the firm'smanagers.This signalling hypothesis can
be represented by
(14) MV =PVE-f(UVB)
with f'<0. If each increase in UVB is viewed as increasingly ominous then
f'' <0.
On the other hand, market participants may feel that low UVBwill
ultimately be paid but increasing amounts of UVB are increasingly unlikely
to be met for reasons unrelated to the 30% rule. In this case f' <0but
f'' >0.To test this hypothesis against the signalling hypothesis, I added a term
2 . . . . ofthe form (UVB/A) to the Variant 2 equation. This term was insignificant
but positive (log likelihood =-2.37)favoring a view that each successive
increase in UVB is felt to be less important in relation to previous
increases. Thus the signalling hypothesis is not supported. Further this
likelihood value is far less than that of the Variant 1 specification. Thus
the squared term may merely proxy the discrete break at the 30% rule (Figure 1).
The most attractive interpretation of the econometric results is,
therefore, that
1. liabilities above some discrete level do not diminish the
value of a firm's shares and this effect does seem to be
associated with the PBGC 30% rule and
2. the stock market believes pension liabilities as reported
in financial statements are understated.—19—
This paper therefore provides evidence that ERISA, byrelieving
firms of the responsibility for part of UVB without providingfor
alternative funding, may contribute to a fall in aggregate saving.
Equity values appear unaffected by the partof UVB in excess of
.3 MV. A clear conclusion is that one can no longer acceptthe
naive (Variant 2) results obtained by previous researchersand
used by Feldstein (1978) to discuss the lihkage betweenUVB and
aggregate saving._2 0
FOOTNOTES
1. Vesting is the employee's right, on termination of employment prior
to retirement, to all or part of the pension benefits which have
accrued on his behalf under the pension plan's benefit formula.
Usually the actual payment of these benefits will be deferred
until he reaches retirement age. In rare instances there may be
provision for a lump sum settlement at the time of termination..
A pension plan is incompletely funded if the value of assets in
the pension fund is less than the accumulated vested pension benefits.
The assets in the pension fund cannot be withdrawn by the employer.
2. Details of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) are
given in United States (1974).
3. Discussions with the Value Line analysts indicate that these pro-
jections are based on fundamental analysis of the type advocated in
standard texts on financial investment, e.g. Graham, Dodd and Cottle
(1962).
4. Feldstein (1978) argues that y should be multiplied by 1/A so that
the equations (ha) and L1b) when multiplied by A would have a constant
term. However, the inclusion of a constant in either specification
has little theoretical justification. The usual attempt at interpre-
tation of a constant term in a valuation equation is as a premium for
stock issue. This consideration would favor the specification of
(h1 and (hib) rather than the Feldstein specification since a stock
premium would probably be proportional to the total size of the firm.
I tried the Feldstein specification which produced a lower log likeli-
hood value (—7.44) but otherwise similar results to Table 1, Variant 1.
5. Similar results were obtained using data for 1974 and 1975. The
absolute values of and 12 fell from 1974 to 1975 and from 1975
to 1976.
6. Ehrbar (1977) argues that under—reporting may be widespread.
7. If a general understatement of UVB explains the absolute magnitudes
of and 2 then it appears that either the extent of this under-
statement or the preception of it has diminished from 1974 to 1976
(see footnote 5).
8. In reality the extent of any understatement varies by firm. Thus
estimating jiisonly a rough solution to this measurement problem.
I did however estimatebychoosing different values of and
then estimating the parameters of the model (ha) —(hic)conditional
on each value of q. The value of i.'i yielding the highest value of
the log of the likelihood function (22.6) was given by i'i =10.To
the best of my knowledge there is no method for producing a t—statistic—21—
onthistype of switching parameter. A case by case adjustment
ofreported liabilities by a coon, generally accepted set of
assumptions would be extremely difficult and time—consuming.
However, this latter approach is clearly the most desirable and
shouldbe part of further research in this area.—22—
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